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The recent literature on the effects of welfare on marriage and fertility includes studies
employing a wide variety of methodologies and data sets and covering different time periods. A majority
of the studies show that welfare has a significantly negative effect on marriage or positive effect on
fertility rather than none at all, and thus the current consensus is that the welfare system probably has
some effect on these demographic outcomes. Considerable uncertainty surrounds this consensus because
a sizable minority of the studies find no effect at all, because the magnitudes of the estimated effects vary
widely, and because puzzling and unexplained differences exist across the studies by race and
methodological approach. At present, and with the information provided in the studies, the source of
these disparities cannot be determined. While a neutral weighing of the evidence still leads to the
conclusion that the welfare system affects marriage and fertility, research needs to be conducted to
resolve the conflicting findings.The Effect of Welfare on Marriage and Fertility:
What Do We Know and What Do We Need to Know?
The research literature over the last 30 years on the effects of welfare on marriage and fertility
includes studies employing a variety of methodologies and data sets and covering different time periods.
Several studies were conducted in the 1970s and early 1980s, but a second wave of studies began in the
mid-1980s and is still under way. Based on the early work, a consensus among researchers developed a
decade or so ago that the welfare system had no effect on marriage and fertility. However, a majority of
the newer studies show that welfare has a significantly negative effect on marriage or positive effect on
fertility rather than none at all. Because of this shift in findings, the current consensus is that the welfare
system probably has some effect on these demographic outcomes.
However, considerable uncertainty surrounds this consensus because a significant minority of the
studies find no effect at all, because the magnitudes of the estimated effects vary widely, and because
puzzling and unexplained differences exist across the studies by race and methodological approach. For
example, the findings show considerably stronger effects for white women than for black or nonwhite
women, despite the greater participation rates of the latter group in the welfare system. Also, the findings
often differ when demographic outcomes are correlated with welfare generosity in different
ways—variation in welfare benefits across states in a particular year, for example, versus variation in
welfare benefits over time. Whether the differences in study findings result from inherent differences in
different data sets or from differences in the way the data are analyzed—for example, in estimating
techniques, definitions of variables, characteristics of the individuals examined, and other influences
controlled for—is difficult to determine because most authors do not systematically attempt to determine
why their findings differ from those of other studies.
This paper summarizes the relevant literature and discusses the differences across studies.
Because of the diversity of findings, methodological considerations necessarily must be a major focus of
the discussion. Section I provides background on the U.S. welfare system and those aspects of its2
structure relevant to marriage and fertility and discusses the context of social science theories of marriage
and fertility in which the welfare system plays a role. Section II outlines the different questions of
interest and discusses those questions that have been addressed in the research literature. Section III
discusses the methodological approach taken in the research literature toward the question and contrasts
the method of experimentation with the nonexperimental method of using natural program variation.
Broad trends in the U.S. on demographic outcomes and the welfare system are presented in Section IV;
these trends establish a set of basic patterns in the data. Section V reviews the multivariate research
studies on the question, compares and contrasts their approaches, and discusses possible reasons for the
diversity of findings. Finally, suggestions for future research are outlined in Section VI.
I. BACKGROUND
The U.S. welfare system is currently undergoing major changes as a result of 1996 legislation,
the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act. However, because the research
reviewed in this paper entirely concerns the welfare system prior to this legislation, only the old system
will be described here. The relevance of this research to the future welfare system will be discussed in
the last section.
Only the features of the system specific to marriage and fertility will be outlined. The most well-
known aspect of the welfare system bearing on marriage and fertility is the set of eligibility rules in the
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program resulting in a high concentration of single
mothers among recipients, a relatively tiny fraction of married couples on the rolls, and no families or
individuals without children (single mothers are defined as women with children under 18 in the
household but no spouse or cohabiting partner present). As specified in the 1935 Social Security Act
creating the program, AFDC is intended to provide cash support only to children living without at least
one of their biological parents. Thus children for whom one parent has died are eligible, but so are3
The eligibility rules have many other important facets not discussed here, especially rules governing
1
eligibility of children living with cohabiting adults and whose caretaker parent has remarried. For details on these
rules see Moffitt, Reville, and Winkler (1997).
AFDC recipient families are automatically eligible for Food Stamp benefits, so this also results in a
2
disproportionate number of single-parent families actually on the Food Stamp rolls.
children whose parents never married but are living apart, or whose parents are divorced or separated.
The mother, or other caretaker relative, is also supported by the grant. Children living with both parents
are eligible, along with their parents, only for the AFDC-UP program (UP for “unemployed parent”), but
eligibility for those benefits has additional conditions requiring that at least one parent be unemployed,
that that parent have a significant history of employment, and that the family meet the same stringent
income and asset requirements as a single-parent family. As a result, AFDC-UP families constitute only a
small fraction of the AFDC caseload.
1
The Food Stamp program provides food coupons to low-income families regardless of family
structure and hence does not have the same “bias” toward single-parent families as does AFDC.
Eligibility and benefits for the program are based on the income and resources of a group of people who
eat together, regardless of their relationship to each other. Thus two-parent as well as single-parent
families are eligible, although the fixed upper income and asset limits knock more two-parent families
than single-parent families out of eligibility.  Single individuals and childless families are also eligible.
2
The Medicaid program provides subsidized medical care assistance to poor families. Historically
it has been available primarily to AFDC recipients and therefore has the same bias toward single-parent
families. However, in the last decade eligibility for Medicaid benefits has been greatly broadened to
include children in poor families even if both parents are present and the family is off AFDC. However,
despite the growth of Medicaid recipients under these new eligibility rules, the program is still
disproportionately composed of single-parent families.
Housing programs come in several different forms—public as well as subsidized private housing,
for example—and provide housing at below-market rents to families with low income and assets.4
It is worth noting, however, that any program which provides benefits on the basis of the income of a
3
family unit rather than the income of individuals will necessarily, and inherently, have at least a minimal amount of
bias toward single-parent families. If bias is defined as occurring when the income gain to marrying, for example, is
less in the presence of a government program than in its complete absence, then a welfare program will be
nonbiasing only if benefits are completely unaffected if a single parent marries. But this violates the definition of a
targeted transfer program, namely, one that concentrates its benefits on those with lower income.
However, these programs are distinguished from the other programs discussed above by their non-
entitlement status. Expenditure allocations to local public housing authorities limit the amount of funds
available and therefore restrict the number of recipients who can be served. Eligible families that apply
and are accepted but cannot be supported are put on waiting lists that can be as long as several years. To
choose from among the pool of eligibles, local housing authorities are required to give certain groups
priority over others (called “preferences”). One of the preferred groups is AFDC recipients. This, along
with the fact that family income (per family member) is lower among the single-parent population than
the two-parent population, results in a high fraction of single-parent families receiving housing benefits.
However, the preference is not absolute, and there have been times in the history of the program when
middle-income families were preferred, so there is a sizable representation of two-parent families in the
housing program.
In summary, therefore, the conventional perception of the U.S. welfare system as largely favoring
single-parent families over two-parent families, childless couples, and individuals is essentially correct.
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This favored treatment affects incentives to marry as well as incentives to have children. An additional
fertility incentive arises, however, because benefits are based on the number of children present in the
family unit. Hence the monetary cost of having an additional child is smaller in the presence of these
welfare programs than it would be in their absence.
That these marriage and fertility incentives may have an effect on behavior can be understood
both with common sense and from a variety of theoretical perspectives. The most natural modern
conceptual framework is the economic theory of marriage and fertility as developed by Becker (1981)5
because of that model’s emphasis on the economic gains to marriage and on the economic benefits and
costs of having children. However, one could easily understand incentives induced by the welfare system
without the formalization of the Beckerian theory, since almost any framework in which economic
factors play a role will predict that, holding all else fixed, a welfare system biased against marriage and
toward childbearing will change behavior in that direction (although the magnitude of the effect can, of
course, be large or small).
Although more complex theories can give different predictions, the only simple economic theory
that does so is that which conceptualizes single-parenthood as an unlucky outcome of an attempt at
marriage (or union formation in general) and in which benefits play the role of insurance against that
outcome. Standard economic theories imply that government provision of such insurance—welfare
benefits—would induce more individuals to attempt marriage in the same way that providing insurance
protecting checking accounts against bank failure encourages individuals to put their money in banks.
The difficulty with this way of viewing the problem is that it ignores what is called the “moral hazard”
problem in insurance terminology—the simple fact that individuals who are given insurance have an
incentive to put themselves more at risk or even to cause the insured-against event to happen. In the case
of welfare and family structure, this simply means that individuals have an incentive to take actions that
lead, directly or indirectly, to single motherhood as an outcome.
Welfare effects on marital and fertility behavior occur necessarily through one of a fixed set of
routes. An unmarried childless woman entering adulthood may have a child out of wedlock, and welfare
may affect the probability of this outcome. She may later marry and possibly have additional children
within marriage, but then separate or divorce, returning to a state of single motherhood; welfare may also
affect the likelihood of this outcome. Alternatively, she may marry and begin childbearing within
marriage but then divorce or separate, which is a different path to the same eventual outcome. Once6
divorced or separated, she may have additional children out of wedlock, and she may or may not remarry.
Both of these behaviors may be affected by the presence of welfare and the level of benefits.
Whether welfare is more likely to influence some of these behaviors than others is an empirical
matter, but it is often argued on intuitive grounds that some “routes” to single motherhood are more
likely to be affected than others. For example, it has been suggested that an unmarried woman’s second
and subsequent out-of-wedlock births may be more influenced by welfare benefits, especially if the
woman is already on welfare, than the first birth because the first birth is more likely to be unintended
and because awareness of welfare is less acute before a woman has been on welfare. It is also often
proposed that divorce and separation are likely to be less affected by welfare than are remarriage
probabilities, because divorce and separation are heavily influenced by other factors—most notably,
whether the marital “match” is a good one—while remarriage (so it is argued) is more subject to rational
calculation. These notions are helpful as a starting point in thinking about differential motivations for
women in different positions, but they should be regarded initially only as hypotheses to be tested.
When other determinants of marriage and fertility are considered, a rich set of conceptual models
developed over decades of research becomes available. Some of the more important factors posited to
affect marriage propensities and fertility rates are economic opportunities for women, economic
opportunities for men (often hypothesized to have the opposite effects of those of women), sex and sex-
employment ratios in the population, neighborhood effects, and the influence of education, family
background, and other factors on social norms and values. We will not elaborate on these factors, but it is
important to emphasize that many influences other than welfare benefits affect marriage and fertility
decisions, a point often de-emphasized in studies whose sole focus is a single-minded search for welfare
effects. Moreover, even if these other factors are not examined in detail when testing for the effects of
the welfare system, it is always necessary either implicitly or explicitly to parcel out their influence
relative to that of welfare, which means in most cases controlling for these other factors statistically, a7
point to be discussed further in the next section. Since a single mother does, after all, have alternatives to
welfare, it is only the influence of the welfare benefit relative to the alternatives that should affect her
choices. Unfortunately, the large number and diversity of these alternative factors make it difficult
empirically to control for them all, leaving the door open to doubts as to whether it is welfare that is
affecting behavior or some other omitted factor, as will be discussed below in the review of the empirical
research literature.
II. DIFFERENT QUESTIONS OF INTEREST
Turning from theories of welfare effects to the more specific issue of what empirical questions
are of interest, an important distinction must be made at the outset between what may properly be called
a “time-series” question and a “cross-sectional” question. An important time-series question is why
marriage rates have declined and nonmarital childbearing rates have increased in the U.S. The
corresponding welfare-related question is whether the welfare system has contributed to these trends. An
important cross-sectional question, on the other hand, is whether eliminating or reducing the generosity
of welfare would raise marriage rates and lower nonmarital fertility rates, holding all else fixed.
The answers to these questions need not be the same. One may simultaneously conclude, for
example, that welfare is not a major contributor to the time-series trends in marriage and fertility but also
that welfare, if reduced in generosity, would have the effects mentioned above, holding all else fixed.
Differing answers to these two questions are not necessarily inconsistent because all else is not “held
fixed” in time series; many other factors are changing at the same time, most notably changes in the
economic and social environment and in social norms. These other factors could have been primarily
responsible for the marriage and fertility trends and could have outweighed any welfare effect. However,
if it is concluded that welfare would have had an effect if nothing else had changed, one must also
conclude that the time-series trend would have been different if welfare had not trended the way it did.8
In a regression framework, “eliminating the influence of time trends in the data” is meant to imply, for
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example, entering dummies for year or other time interval into the equation.
Exceptions exist, and more experimental evaluations examining demographic outcomes are now under
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way. See the study by Maynard et al. (forthcoming) for a discussion of state-level experiments on demographic
outcomes. Also, experiments in the 1980s examined the effect of a negative income tax on marital stability (Hannan
and Tuma, 1990; Cain and Wissoker, 1990), but the results cannot be generalized to the AFDC program.
Some analysts argue that only the time-series question is important, and it does receive much of
the public’s attention. However, the cross-sectional question is also important because it bears on what
would happen in the future if the welfare system were altered, regardless of what might have caused
marriage and fertility trends in the past. If welfare has had undesirable effects, for example, it could
nonetheless be used as a tool to increase marriage rates and reduce nonmarital fertility rates in the future.
In any case, as the review below will show, virtually the entire research literature on the effect of welfare
on demographic outcomes has focused on the cross-sectional question, not the time-series question. The
majority of analyses have attempted to “hold everything else fixed” in a cross-sectional sense. Indeed,
those studies that have utilized data over multiple time periods, which could conceivably examine time-
series questions, have, by and large, deliberately eliminated the influence of time trends in the data and
instead have based their welfare results on the cross-sectional variation in the data.
4
III. METHODOLOGIES USED IN ESTIMATING WELFARE EFFECTS
Experimental versus Nonexperimental Analysis
Although nonexperimental analysis is the norm in the social science research literature,
experimental analysis is more familiar today to policy analysts involved in evaluations of welfare
reforms. The most well-known experimental evaluations have examined the effects of various
interventions on the employment, earnings, and welfare participation outcomes of welfare recipients
(e.g., see the studies reviewed in Gueron and Pauly, 1991). However, experimental methods have not
been widely applied to the study of welfare effects on fertility and marriage.  Because much of the
59
discussion of reasons for differences in study findings will turn on differences in nonexperimental
methodologies—or, in the language of evaluation, the use of different nonexperimental comparison
groups—a brief discussion of the reason that experimental methodologies have not been applied in this
area is warranted.
The method of experimentation, wherein a randomly chosen experimental group of individuals is
given a “treatment” and a randomly chosen control group is not, is a general methodology for inferring
causal effects of a program or an alteration in a program. One can imagine experimenting with the level
of welfare benefits, for example, giving the treatment group a higher level than the control group (or
possibly giving the control group none, if the total effect of welfare is of interest). Clearly the
methodology cannot be applied in time-series because the rest of society cannot be frozen in place and
held “fixed” when the welfare system is altered. However, experimental methods are not always easily
applied in cross-section either, for a number of reasons. One problem is that the outcomes of interest
here—marriage and fertility—do not respond quickly to changes in the welfare and socioeconomic
environment, so any experiment to measure welfare effects might have to continue several years for a
credible estimate to be obtained. A second problem is that many welfare reforms are intended to have
“community” effects—that is, effects that percolate through the community and affect general norms.
Experiments cannot capture such outcomes unless the experiments are “saturation-site” in nature—that
is, unless entire communities are made the unit of observation and either all individuals within that
community are given the treatment or all are not. Saturation-site experiments are rare and have never
been very successful when tried. A third problem is that experiments can at best determine the effects of
only one “bundle” of welfare reforms at a time, making it difficult to isolate the effects of any one piece
of a welfare reform program from others that are part of the same reform package. This problem afflicts
many of the welfare experiments undertaken in the last decade or so in the U.S. Fourth, and related, it is
often difficult to extrapolate and generalize from experimental results, since experiments by and large10
Even the 1996 welfare legislation does not eliminate welfare entirely for anyone, since a minimum number
6
of years of receipt is guaranteed.
test only one reform, or one bundle of welfare reforms, at a time. Fifth, for ethical reasons experiments
are limited in the types of reforms that can be tested (e.g., eliminating benefits entirely for the
experimental group has, thus far, not been deemed ethical).
6
For these reasons, almost all research studies on the effects of welfare on marriage and fertility
have utilized nonexperimental methods. Nonexperimental methods identify the effects of welfare by
using natural variation in the welfare system, variation that generally arises through the political process,
and by determining the existence and magnitude of correlations of such variation with variation in
fertility and marital outcomes. Variations in benefits across states, across individuals within states, and
over time across states have all been used for this purpose. Unfortunately, different sources of welfare
variation may have different empirical associations with marriage and fertility behavior—even though
they should not “in theory”—and it is possible that this will lead to conflicting results across methods.
Reconciling those differences requires determining why they yield different results and what
confounding factors might be present in each.
Most of the research in this area has examined the effects and correlates of variation in the level
of welfare benefits rather than of variation in other features of welfare programs, such as earnings
disregards, training programs, and child support reform. While this may seem limiting from the point of
view of a policymaker, for whom more specific programmatic reforms are generally of greater interest,
much can be learned from the basic issue of whether welfare-eligible women alter their behavior in
response to benefit levels. If they do so, it is not unreasonable to assume that they will respond as well to
changes in other characteristics of the program which have, either directly or indirectly, monetary
implications.11
Types of Natural Variation Used in the Research Literature
Aside from time-series variation, three types of natural variation in the welfare system have been
utilized in most studies: cross-state comparisons of levels, cross-state comparisons of changes over time,
and within-state comparisons. The differences are important because welfare-effect estimates often differ
depending on which method is used.
A cross-state comparison of levels is the most common method in the literature and involves a
determination of whether levels of welfare benefits are correlated with marriage and fertility behavior
across states. Such comparisons need not literally be conducted at the state level but rather can be
conducted at the individual level as long as the data include individuals in multiple states. The
widespread use of this technique is based on the recognition that AFDC benefits are set at the state level
and hence are generally the same within states, at least for families of the same size and with the same
income and other characteristics. Consequently, holding these family characteristics constant, benefits
vary only across states. Using individual-level data, one can control for other confounding factors at the
individual level (age, education, and the “other factors” referred to previously) and therefore get closer to
determining the effect of welfare “holding all else fixed.”
Cross-state comparisons of changes are less common but have recently gained popularity in the
research literature, where they are often called “state fixed effects” models. In this case, changes over
time in benefit levels across states are compared with changes over time in outcome variables such as
marriage and fertility. A case can be made that such comparisons are superior to those using cross-state
comparisons of levels, inasmuch as the levels of benefits and levels of marriage and fertility behavior
may covary across states not only because of some true relationship but also for some other, spurious,
reason. For example, the low AFDC benefit levels and high marriage rates in most Southern states may
not reflect a true welfare effect but may instead reflect the fact that the South is socially a relatively
conservative region where social and cultural norms encourage marriage and is also politically a12
This notion appears to have first been explicitly discussed and emphasized by Ellwood and Bane (1985).
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A related possibility is that the comparison-of-changes method measures a “short-term” response while the
8
comparison-of-levels method measures a “long-term” response if it shows where marriage and fertility levels have
ended up after several years of adjustment. Thus it may be that the two methods are simply not measuring the same
thing.
relatively conservative region where elected representatives do not legislate generous welfare benefits.
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In this latter interpretation, a positive correlation between benefit levels and marriage would arise
because a third variable—social, cultural, and political norms—causes them both, not because benefits
affect marriage. In the method of cross-state comparisons of changes, changes in benefits over time are
inspected instead of differences in levels. For example, as it turns out, benefit levels have been falling in
the South more slowly than in the Midwest over the last two decades; if there is a true effect of welfare
on marriage, then marriage rates should fall less (or rise more) in the South than in the Midwest, even if
the two regions started off at very different levels—that is, even if marriage levels were higher in the
South to begin with for other reasons.
The method of cross-state comparisons of changes has its own complications, however. One
important problem is the difficulty of measuring long-term responses to changes in welfare benefits.
Because marriage and fertility behaviors do not respond quickly to alterations in benefit levels, a fairly
long time interval must be examined to measure changes in behavior.  If one attempts to examine long
8
time intervals, an additional problem arises because significant state in- and out-migration may occur,
which may change state-level average outcomes merely because the composition of the population has
changed, not because a fixed set of individuals have changed their behavior. More generally, it has to be
assumed that over long time intervals the “omitted” influences—for example, the social and cultural
norms referred to previously—do not change, and do not change differentially across states. In addition, a
comparison of cross-state changes in welfare merely throws the bias problem back one stage, for it then
needs to be determined why some states increase their benefits faster, or lower them less rapidly, than13
other states, and whether omitted state-specific time-varying influences might confound the welfare
effect by being responsible for both benefit trends and marriage and fertility trends.
Within-state comparisons are the most difficult and the least used, for they rely on comparisons
of outcomes for women within a state who are offered different benefit levels, or on comparisons
between women who are eligible and women who are not eligible for welfare. The problem with this
method is that, because the eligibility and benefit determination rules are generally the same statewide,
benefit-level differences between women within a state are almost always associated with a demographic
characteristic (e.g., having children) which by itself could have an impact on the outcomes of interest. A
comparison of eligibles with ineligibles is an extreme version of this method.
Time-series analysis is a fourth method, which is fraught with the difficulty already mentioned of
controlling for alternative factors that are also changing over time.
IV. BASIC TIME-SERIES PATTERNS IN WELFARE AND DEMOGRAPHIC OUTCOMES
Three of the methodologies—cross-state comparison of levels, cross-state comparison of
changes, and time-series analysis—can be studied by examining trends over time in unadjusted state-
level or national-level aggregates of demographic outcomes on the one hand and measures of welfare
generosity on the other. It is instructive to present the basic patterns of these correlations with unadjusted
aggregates before reviewing the multivariate analyses in the econometric literature. As will be seen, the
patterns that emerge in this analysis capture, in large degree, the patterns revealed by the multivariate
analyses. Consequently, much of the basic story is understandable in relatively simple terms and does not
need recourse to controlling for additional variables or use of specialized statistical methods.
The pure time-series method involves a simple comparison of trends in welfare benefits and in
demographic outcomes. Figure 1 shows the time trend in welfare benefits of different types in the U.S.
over the period 1970–1993. It has been noted repeatedly that the time-series evidence for a welfare effectFIGURE 1
Source: U.S. House of Representatives, 1994 (pp. 378, 782, 806).
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on marriage and fertility is weak because welfare benefits have declined in real terms over the 1970s and
1980s while marriage rates have declined and nonmarital childbearing has increased. This is confirmed in
Figure 1, which indicates that real AFDC benefits have fallen continuously since the early 1970s. Real
Food Stamp benefits have remained roughly constant, primarily because they are indexed to inflation,
while real Medicaid benefits were roughly fixed until the mid-1980s, when they began to rise. The sum
of benefits therefore declined up to the late 1980s. It did begin to rise at that time, but this increase is too
late to explain the secular trends in marriage and fertility. In addition, Medicaid benefits began to be
available to many poor families off AFDC in the late 1980s, thereby weakening the link between welfare
and the availability of medical care.
The inconsistency between benefit and demographic trends could mask the presence of long lags
(Murray, 1993). The generosity of the transfer system increased significantly in the late 1960s and early
1970s, as Food Stamps were mandated nationally and the Medicaid system was expanded. It is possible
that this expansion of benefits resulted in increases in (say) nonmarital childbearing 10 years later, if the
effect of the expansion took time to occur because social norms were slow to adjust. This is a difficult
hypothesis to prove or disprove because the trends have been so universal. It is not possible to isolate
specific communities where benefits increased much more than other communities, for example, and
where the population was fixed for 10 years so that lagged effects could be measured. Consequently, the
importance of this argument at the present time must rest largely on whether one believes that low-
income families react quickly or slowly to the monetary opportunities facing them.
As noted previously, the inconsistency between time trends in benefits and demographic
outcomes may only mean that other factors changing over time have masked the effect of welfare
benefits; this is the major weakness of the method. There may have been changes in the other factors
affecting marriage and divorce—economic opportunities for women and men, the availability of partners
in the marriage market, and changes in social norms. More persuasive evidence on the effect of welfare16
The illegitimacy ratios are taken from Vital Statistics reports.
9
This is because single motherhood is an overall category that can be reached by any of the routes
10
discussed earlier—from nonmarital childbearing, divorce or separation, and failure to remarry. Thus it is a summary
measure of all these routes taken together.
The March CPS is used. Single mothers are defined as women without a spouse in the household but who
11
have children under 18. Family and subfamily heads are included as separate observations. The rates are computed
as a fraction of all women 18–64. The AFDC benefit variables are those for a family of four with no other income.
per se might therefore be gained from cross-state comparisons of levels because these comparisons are
made at a single point in time, across states, and hence are not complicated by such major time trends.
Figure 2, drawn from Murray (1993), shows illegitimacy rates and welfare benefit levels among white
women in different states in 1988.  A positive relationship between benefits and illegitimacy is clear
9
from the figure. Much of the relationship comes from the concentration of Southern states with low
benefits and low rates of illegitimacy, although the relationship would still be positive (but weaker) if the
South were omitted. Thus some evidence for a positive effect of welfare on out-of-wedlock childbearing
is yielded by these data.
To insure that this pattern is not special to the particular data set, time period, and variables used
by Murray, Current Population Survey (CPS) data for 1993 were obtained for this study and tabulations
of welfare benefits and rates of single motherhood by state were computed. Rates of single motherhood
rather than illegitimacy are examined because single motherhood is a broader and more inclusive
measure of the demographic outcome of interest.  Figure 3 shows the cross-state result for white
10
women.  Interestingly, very little relationship between headship and benefits appears in this figure,
11
contrary to the results of Murray. A least-squares regression line, also shown in the figure, confirms this
visual impression of only a slight positive relationship between the two variables. However, when
women 20–44 and without a high-school diploma are examined instead—a subpopulation with relatively
high welfare participation rates—the positive correlation reappears with a greater magnitude (Figure 4).FIGURE 2
White Women, 1988
Source: Murray, 1993.FIGURE 3
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Single Motherhood Rates and Real AFDC Benefits by State: CPS, 1993











0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900
























This simple analysis shows that the level of state welfare benefits is substantially correlated with
single-motherhood rates. Many of the largest states such as New York, California, and Illinois have
relatively generous welfare systems as well as high rates of single motherhood; another large state,
Texas, has low benefits and low single-motherhood rates. Clearly, a major question is whether this
simple correlation is the result of some other characteristic of the populations of these states or of their
socioeconomic environments; however, as will be seen in the next section, this positive covariation
persists even when other measurable influences are controlled for and therefore appears to be reasonably
robust.
The positive relationship holds for other periods as well—all the way back to the 1960s, when
CPS microdata are first available for these computations. It also holds when other measures of the
welfare system—including Medicaid—are included. The relationship also appears in simple regional
comparisons. For example, the Northeast has high welfare benefits and high rates of single motherhood
while the South has the lowest benefits and lowest single-motherhood rates. The Midwest and West have
much higher benefits than in the South and slightly higher rates of single motherhood.
To determine whether these comparisons of levels have the same implications as those from a
cross-state comparisons of changes, CPS data from a different year can be compared to the 1993 data.
The following tables use CPS information from 1977, when benefit levels were quite a bit higher. Rates
of single motherhood were lower in 1977 overall, but the issue here is whether those states that lowered
their AFDC benefits the least—benefits fell in virtually all states—also had the largest increases in single
motherhood; if so, this could be taken as evidence of an effect of welfare consistent with the pure cross-
state comparison of levels.
As Figure 5 indicates, however, the relationship between benefit levels and single motherhood is
extremely weak for young, less-educated white women when this type of comparison is made. Although
different states lowered benefits over this period by different amounts, the increases in singleFIGURE 5
Change in Single Motherhood Rates and Real AFDC Benefits 
by State from 1977 to 1993: CPS
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motherhood across the states were fairly uniformly distributed. New Jersey, for example, which reduced
its benefit by a large amount over the period ($257 per month reduction) saw its single-motherhood rate
increase by about 5 percentage points, whereas Texas, which reduced its benefit by much less ($78 per
month) saw a similar increase of 4 percentage points.
Mechanically, the difference in results between the different comparisons arises from two facts.
First, over the 1970s and 1980s, states with high average welfare benefits had higher than average rates
of single motherhood (as well as nonmarital fertility rates); this relationship held not just for 1993 but
also for 1977 and other years. Second, over the course of the 1970s and 1980s, states that raised benefits
more than others—or, more accurately, lowered them less than others—did not experience faster than
average increases in single motherhood and fertility. Welfare benefits across U.S. regions have
converged slightly over the 1970s and 1980s, with the Southern states lowering benefits the least and
Northeastern states lowering their benefits the most, but this pattern does not correspond at all to rates of
change of single motherhood among less-educated white women (e.g., the Northeast experienced the
greatest increase in single motherhood even though it, along with the industrial Midwestern states,
lowered benefits the most).
The difference between the results using these two sources of welfare variation may stem from
the omission of factors in one or both of the two comparisons. One possibility is that the levels
comparison omits key state differences that affect both marriage and fertility behavior as well as benefits.
For example, as mentioned earlier in the paper, Southern states have strong pro-marriage social norms
and also have low welfare benefits; the correlation between marriage and benefits may therefore arise
coincidentally. The fact that the South did not lower its benefits very much over time, and yet did not
experience high growth of single motherhood relative to regions that lowered their benefits a great deal,23
For example, Hoynes (1996) used data from individuals followed over time (i.e., panel data) to determine
12
whether the correlation between changes in single motherhood at the individual level and changes in benefits is the
same as that at the state level. She found this to be the case for white women. This supports the interpretation of the
cross-state differences as traceable to differences in the types of women in those states.
suggests indeed that the cross-state levels relationship may have been spurious and due to other factors.
12
However, it may also be the case that the changes comparison omits some factor that is causing benefits
to change at different rates across states. Differences in rates of change in the economic performance of
different states, in unemployment rates, and in related factors may have been responsible for both the
change in benefits and the change in single motherhood. For example, the South experienced significant
economic growth in the late 1970s and 1980s and closed its economic gap with the rest of the country to
some degree; this could have caused both its relative increase in welfare benefits and its relative decline
in single motherhood. The way to begin testing these hypotheses, and reconciling the different forms of
evidence (levels versus changes), is to attempt to control for some of these omitted variables in a
multivariate analysis. This is one of the roles of the econometric research to be described below.
The patterns for black women are roughly similar. As shown in Figure 6, the levels of single
motherhood for young, less-educated black women are positively related to welfare benefits. Also, a
comparison of changes in single-motherhood rates and benefit levels also shows no relationship between
the two, if not a negative relationship, as seen in Figure 7. Overall, single-motherhood rates grew quite a
bit faster for black women than for white women over this period, but, as for white women, the rate of
growth across states was not closely related to the magnitude of changes in welfare benefits in the state.
Single-motherhood rates for less-educated black women grew at about the same rate in the South, the
Northeast, and the Midwest despite very different changes in welfare benefits in those regions.FIGURE 6
Single Motherhood Rates and Real AFDC Benefits by State: 
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The studies were located by searching the economics and sociology literatures since 1970 and following
13
references to other articles therein, as well as by a general search for articles on the subject since 1970 in a variety
of other sources. All studies located were included which (i) had the estimation of the effect of AFDC on marriage,
fertility, or a related demographic outcome as a significant, major focus of the study and (ii) were either published
or had been circulated in draft form by May 1996. No study that met these criteria was intentionally excluded. It
should also be noted that there are 68 estimates but fewer individual studies than this because most studies provided
estimates for both racial categories. Estimates for outcomes other than marriage and fertility—e.g., living
arrangements—are excluded from the table but appear in the Appendix.
V. RESULTS FROM MULTIVARIATE ECONOMETRIC MODELS
A table listing many of the relevant econometric studies appears in the Appendix. A more
detailed summary of each is available in Hudson and Moffitt (1997). These studies all use one of the four
methods of obtaining welfare variation described in Section III and (except for within-state variation)
discussed in graphical terms in Section IV. Relative to the graphical analysis, a simple question that can
be answered here is whether the patterns of effects across states, over time, and for different racial groups
are any different in a multivariate analysis where additional covariates are entered into the model and
where more sophisticated methods of estimation are employed.
Table 1 summarizes the results of 68 different estimates from these studies, classified by the
method by which welfare variation was obtained and by the nature of the result.  Over all types of
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studies, a slight majority find a significantly negative effect on marriage or a positive effect on fertility
rather than an insignificant effect (ignoring the mixed estimates, which could be classified in either way).
This may seem surprising in light of what was taken to be the conventional wisdom approximately 10
years ago, when it was generally believed that the evidence did not support much of an effect of welfare
on marriage and fertility at all. However, that consensus was based on studies from the 1970s, which
indeed showed weaker results than the studies that have been conducted since then. Among analysts who
work on the topic, there is now a rough consensus that the evidence does support some effect of welfare
on marriage and fertility, although the magnitude of the effect remains in question. Whether this change
in estimates has been a result of superior analytical methods in the later studies or an increase in the27
TABLE 1
Counts of Studies of Effect of Welfare
on Marriage and Fertility,
by Nature of Findings and Source of Welfare Variation
                                                     Race Category                                                   
           All Races                        White                  Nonwhite or Black   
Insig. Sig. Mixed Insig. Sig. Mixed Insig. Sig. Mixed
All Types 85 1 8 1 3 5 1 0 1 2 6
By Type:
Cross-state levels 6 3 1 2 9 4 7 6 3
Cross-state changes 1 2 - 4 4 - 1 5 2
Within-state 1 - - 1 - - 1 - -
Time-series - - - 1 - 1 1 1 1
Notes: Entries denote number of studies of each type showing no statistically significant effect of
welfare (Insig.), a significantly negative effect of welfare on marriage or a positive effect on fertility or
both (Sig.), or a mixed pattern of results (Mixed) with some significant and some insignificant results.
Studies listed under “All Races” did not report results separately by race. If a study presented more than
one estimate or model, the author’s preferred estimate is tabulated.28
For example, see Moffitt, 1994, Table 3. Adding age, education, urban residence, and a few other
14
variables to an equation explaining black female headship rates changed a welfare-benefit coefficient from
significance to insignificance. Urban residence, which is less common in the South than in other regions, had a
underlying effect of welfare on behavior is difficult to determine with certainty, but some evidence points
to the latter (Moffitt, 1990).
However, the overall counts of estimates are misleading because they are disproportionately
concentrated among studies using cross-state comparisons of levels—a much smaller number have used
cross-state comparisons of changes and only a handful have used either within-state or time-series
methods—and because the results differ notably by race. As Table 1 shows, a majority of the estimates
from cross-state comparisons of levels show that welfare benefits have an effect of welfare on marriage
or fertility—negative on the former, positive on the latter—but when the results are disaggregated by
race, the studies show more of an effect for white women than for nonwhite or black women. For white
women, nine studies show effects of welfare while only two show no effect. For black and nonwhite
women, however, the split is almost exactly fifty-fifty between those which find an effect and those
which find none. Thus these multivariate analyses are quite similar to those revealed by the simpler
graphical analyses reported in the last section, at least for white women. The implication, perhaps
surprising, is that the additional covariates added in these studies—typically variables like age,
educational level, and family background, as well as (sometimes) variables for the state unemployment
rate, labor market wages, etc.—do not explain away the cross-state differences for white women in the
simple unadjusted cross-state comparisons. For black women, however, these variables do appear to
explain much of the raw difference; black women of similar characteristics in different states do not have
significantly different demographic outcomes, at least in many of the studies in the literature, despite the
differences in benefit levels across those states. It is not possible to determine the precise set of measured
influences that account for the unadjusted difference across states noted earlier, but differences in
urbanization may be one factor.
1429
positive effect on headship rates.
The weaker effect for black women is unexpected in light of their greater rates of participation in
the welfare system as compared to those of white women. In general, it is possible that some omitted
factor differs between the races (including possibly cultural differences), but no such factor has yet been
identified in the literature. Murray (1993) hypothesizes that the low-income black population is more
geographically concentrated than the low-income white population and that neighborhood effects lead to
changes in social norms which increase illegitimacy rates (for example) even in the face of low benefits.
Thus the South, with its concentration of the black population, has high illegitimacy rates. However, if
this argument is correct, it implies that the variation in illegitimacy between black women in different
states is indeed a result of something other than the welfare system. Racial differences therefore must
still be regarded as an unresolved puzzle.
As shown in the table, many fewer studies have included cross-state comparisons of changes
instead of levels. Of those that have used this method, however, the estimated strength of the welfare
system is markedly different from the results of the levels method. For white women, the estimated
welfare effect is quite weakened, because the changes-comparison studies are evenly spread over those
that find an effect and those that find none. For black and nonwhite women, the estimated welfare effect
is actually somewhat stronger in the changes comparison than it was in the levels comparison, in terms of
the relative numbers of studies finding an effect. These results are, therefore, once again quite consistent
with the simpler analysis reported in the previous section for white women but only roughly so for black
women, although even for black women there is about an even split between studies finding a significant
effect and studies finding no effect. In addition, an implication of this pattern of results is that the
differences between the levels and changes comparisons, and between the race differences within each,
are not explained away by the typical covariates used in these analyses.30
Considerable discussion in the research literature has concerned the different results across
methods, but no definitive resolution has been achieved. Although it has been argued that the levels
comparison is subject to the biases noted in Section III, the changes comparison also has the defects
noted there as well. In the absence of definitive evidence that either methodology is incorrect, an equal
weighting of the two still leads to a conclusion that the welfare system has effects on marriage and
fertility, even if not as strong as might be thought based on the levels-comparison methods alone.
Even fewer within-state and time-series studies have been conducted, mainly because within-
state comparisons must find some characteristic of women that affects their eligibility for benefits and
that does not independently affect their marriage and fertility outcomes, while time-series analyses
inevitably have difficulty controlling for all alternative influences that are changing over time. For
example, one study utilizing within-state variation did not examine benefits at all but found no effect of
AFDC participation rates on demographic outcomes across races, a method which implicitly assumes that
no racial difference in demographic outcomes would exist in the absence of AFDC. Another study
compared the divorce rates of women with and without children in states with high and low welfare
benefits, thus implicitly assuming that divorce rates would be identical among women with and without
children in the absence of AFDC. The implausibility of these assumptions shows the extreme weakness
of the method. As for the time-series studies, most simply estimate a variety of bivariate relationships and
find either no effect or mixed effects. The one study that found a negative effect regressed the
illegitimacy ratio in a year on the lagged AFDC participation rate rather than the AFDC benefit; yet the
AFDC participation rate is an endogenous variable and is as much the product of time-series trends in
illegitimacy as its cause. The within-state and time-series methods are sufficiently problematic that they
should probably be dropped from any weighing of the evidence on the question.
While the discussion thus far has concentrated on what now appear to be unresolved differences
between results using levels and changes comparisons, and between races, a considerable variance of31
These remarks are relevant to a common criticism of the “vote-counting” method used in Table
15
1—namely, that simply counting studies which have differing results without any adjustment for the quality of the
study is misleading. The argument here is that in only rare instances can defects in the methodology in a study be
determined to account for any nontrivial amount of the difference in estimates from another study, because too
much else differs as well; hence the magnitude of the bias cannot be isolated.
results also occurs within these types of studies, and quite a few studies in each category differ from the
central tendency of the results for each type. Once again, without further analysis, it is difficult to resolve
most of these differences. To be sure, a few studies appear to suffer from a significant defect that could
explain why their results differ from the central tendency. Many of these defects concern the use of
“endogenous” variables for either the welfare benefit or in controlling for nonwelfare factors, where an
endogenous variable is, roughly, a variable that is a result of women’s marital and fertility choices
themselves (rather than a cause of them). Among the levels studies finding a significant cross-sectional
welfare effect for black and nonwhite women, for example, one study replaced the welfare benefit
(“instrumented” it, using econometric parlance) with such endogenous variables while others included in
the regression variables of questionable exogeneity such as the labor force participation rates and
earnings levels of men and women. Other defects in the studies arise as well. One study constrained the
welfare benefit coefficient to be the same as the coefficient on other income, while another defined the
dependent variable as AFDC receipt, which could by itself and separately be expected to respond to
benefit levels. However, the number of studies that can be dropped from consideration for these reasons
is relatively small, and even for these it cannot be determined conclusively that a correction of the
problem would have had a major quantitative effect on the results Thus most studies must be given some
positive weight in a balancing of the evidence.
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One notable difference between the different studies behind Table 1 is their great diversity in the
types of variables held fixed when estimating welfare effects. Duncan and Hoffman (1990), for example,
control for differences in women’s labor market opportunities and even for differences in the labor
market opportunities of potential male marital partners. Schultz (1994) and Lundberg and Plotnick (1995)32
Although in general the goal is to control for as many alternative influences as possible, this does not
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extend to endogenous variables, discussed previously, which should not be included. However, as important as this
distinction is, it is not necessary to discriminate between exogenous and endogenous variables when one is
attempting merely to answer the simpler factual question of whether differences in regressor sets across studies
account for their differences in estimated welfare impacts. Only after it has been determined which variable sets
lead to what results can the question of which is “best” be addressed.
similarly attempt to control for labor market differences. Ellwood and Bane (1985) and Matthews,
Ribars, and Wilhelm (1995) go the furthest in this direction, controlling for a large number of state
characteristics, even including characteristics of state political systems. On the other hand, Murray
(1993), in an intentional effort to keep his analysis simple and easy to understand, does not adjust for any
other differences between women or across states besides welfare. Roughly speaking, the more variables
controlled for in an analysis, the weaker the estimated effect of welfare—although there is no logical
reason why this need be so—which may also be responsible for some of the differences across studies.
Determining whether this is the case would require reanalyzing some of the data sets under consideration
and estimating similar specifications across data sets.
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In addition to these differences, however, the studies with different results vary in the data set
used, in the age range of the individuals examined, and in the calendar years covered by the data. A
simple way to summarize these differences is by ordinary least squares regression, using as a dependent
variable the strength of the estimated effect and as independent variables the characteristics of the study.
Taking only the studies in the first two rows of Table 1 (levels and changes studies), and defining a
dependent variable (Y) equal to 1 if an effect was found, 0 if not, and .5 if a mixed finding was obtained,
the following regression-based summary of the importance of study characteristics results:
Y   =   -1.33  +  .15*CHANGES  -  .07*BLACK  +  .016*YEAR  +  .022*AGE 
(.16) (.13) (.015) (.010)
                     +  .12*VITAL   + .08*NLSY -  .12*PSID  -  .19*CPS  -  . 04*SM  -  .024*REMDIV
(.19) (.20) (.26) (.20) (.18) (.34)
n=55, R =.24
233
Klerman (1996) argues that the sample sizes in all data sets except the Vital Statistics are insufficient to
17
detect effects of reasonable magnitudes. This is supported by the estimated coefficient on VITAL but not by the
coefficient on CPS, which is the next largest data set.
This conclusion necessarily follows because a young woman who has a premarital birth automatically
18
becomes a single mother, thereby driving up the fraction of the population who are single mothers; but if the overall
rate of single mothers is not significantly affected by welfare, it must be the case that these young mothers later
marry so that, on average and over all ages, the single-motherhood rate ends up not much different than it would
have been if the early premarital childbearing had not occurred. It should be noted that the vast majority of studies
are of nonmarital fertility (about three-quarters) and that there is only one study of divorce, which is why it is
lumped in with remarriage (for which there are only two studies as well).
where CHANGES is a dummy equal to 1 if the study used the changes rather than levels method;
BLACK is a dummy equal to 1 if the estimate in question is for the black or nonwhite population; YEAR
is the median year of the data; AGE is the median age of the individuals in the data; VITAL, NLSY,
PSID, and CPS are dummies equal to 1 if the study used Vital Statistics, National Longitudinal Study of
Youth, Panel Study of Income Dynamics, or Current Population Survey data, respectively (omitted
category is all other data sets); and SM and REMDIV are dummies equal to 1 if the study dependent
variable was single motherhood or divorce-remarriage transitions (omitted category is a dependent
variable pertaining to fertility, almost always nonmarital). Standard errors, in parentheses, are large
because of the small sample size. Interestingly, the results imply that changes studies yield stronger,
rather than lesser, effects when the other variables are controlled; that estimated effects are larger in
samples of older women (contrary to some of the hypotheses in the literature) and grow over time; and
that the effects are stronger when Vital Statistics and NLSY data are used rather than CPS or PSID
data.  The summary also indicates that welfare effects are weaker in studies that examine single
17
motherhood as a single state, or remarriage or divorce, than studies that examine effects on nonmarital
fertility. Taking these results at face value, they imply that the strongest effect of welfare occurs in
nonmarital fertility but that these effects eventually disappear, perhaps because a woman eventually
marries and her subsequent demographic behavior is unaffected by her having experienced an out-of-
wedlock birth previously.  This finding warrants further investigation because it implies that the
1834
A notable difference, however, is that Rosenzweig stratified on the income of the family of origin, while
19
the other three studies stratified on the education of the woman in question. Whether this could explain the differing
results cannot be determined.
implications of early nonmarital childbearing for later family structure may not be as strong as imagined.
Of course, many other differences in these studies have not been controlled for. Once again, however,
only a reanalysis of the various data sets and models can confirm these differences.
The changes-comparisons studies are thought by many analysts to be more reliable than the
levels studies for the reasons noted previously—namely, that the levels studies confound cross-sectional
benefit variations and unobserved variations in economic, social, and political factors. If this view is
taken, there are sufficiently small numbers of these studies to allow more detailed comparisons between
specific individual studies. When the studies are examined at this more detailed level, many possible
explanations for differences appear. For example, the stronger effects found by Jackson and Klerman
(1995) hold only when effects on nonmarital fertility in isolation are estimated; when effects on marital
fertility are examined as well, no effect of welfare on their relative magnitudes is found. This should
properly move the study from one reporting a significant effect to an insignificant effect in Table 1.
Clarke and Strauss (1997), who also find a significant effect of welfare, obtain strong effects with a two
stage least squares procedure using state per capita income (among other variables) as an “instrument”
for the benefit, but per capita income probably belongs in the main equation. Rosenzweig (1995) argues
that his significant estimated effects of welfare result from separating out the low-income population for
analysis, but a similar separation was conducted by Hoynes (1996), Moffitt (1994), and Robins and
Fronstin (1996), who all found effects either not affected by this separation or to be insignificant even for
the disadvantaged population. This suggests that some other difference between the Rosenzweig study
and the other three studies explains their differences in findings.  Finally, these studies differ
19
dramatically in the extent to which other state-level influences are controlled in the regressions, and in
the types of influences controlled for. Table 2 shows the different area-level controls used in the changes35
TABLE 2
State-Level Control Variables Used in Cross-State Changes Studies
Clarke and Strauss (1995)
Median wage of working women; median wage of working men; incarceration rate; unemployment rate;
percentage living in metropolitan area
Ellwood and Bane (1985)
Percentage nonwhite; percentage high school graduate; mean wage; fraction of population under 18;
unemployment rate; fraction of population living in metropolitan area
Hoynes (1996)
Average manufacturing wage; unemployment rate; per capita income; percentage of population over 65;
percentage of population less than 18; percentage black; Republican governor; Republican House;
Republican Senate
Jackson and Klerman (1995):
Unemployment rate; mean wage; mean manufacturing wage; mean wage in retail trade
Lichter, McLaughlin, and Ribar (1996):
Sex ratio; male full-time median income; male education; male employment levels; female full-time
median income; female education; percentage population 65+; percentage black; percentage Hispanic;
percentage rural; population; percentage Catholic; percentage Latter Day Saints; percentage anti-abortion
Protestant
Moffitt (1994)
Unemployment rate; percentage employed in manufacturing; percentage employed in retail and
wholesale trade; percentage employed in services; percentage employed in government




The different studies define their dependent variables slightly differently, and for two of them it is
20
approximately the probability of ever having had a nonmarital birth up to a particular age (which is higher than the
annual probability of the event). The 4 percentage point number is scaled from the numbers actually given in the
articles.
studies. While some of the variables are potentially endogenous, and therefore perhaps should be
excluded, some of the studies control for no area-level variables at all, which could easily explain some
of the differences in findings.
A final important issue concerns the magnitudes of the estimated effects of welfare for those
studies finding significant estimates. Not surprisingly, the estimated magnitudes have a wide dispersion
as well. At the upper end are three studies (Fossett and Kiecolt, 1993; Hill and O’Neill, 1993;
Rosenzweig, 1995) which imply that a 25 percent reduction in welfare benefits would lessen the
probability of a nonmarital birth by approximately .04 or .05.  If the mean probability is .16, this
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suggests a reduction to a level of .11 or .12, or about a 30 percent drop in the rate. In time-series, the
welfare benefit has indeed fallen by about 25 percent over the last 20 years (see Figure 1) while the
nonmarital childbearing rate for this age group doubled (U.S. DHHS, 1995, Figure II-1). One
interpretation of these estimates is therefore that the historical increase in the nonmarital childbearing
rate could have been cut by a significant amount if benefits had been reduced by twice the amount that
they were. At the other end are studies obtaining statistically significant estimates but quite small in
magnitude (Danziger et al., 1982; Duncan and Hoffman, 1990; Lichter, LeClere, and McLaughlin, 1991;
Lichter, McLaughlin, and Ribar, 1996). A typical and recent estimate is that of Lichter, McLaughlin, and
Ribar (1996), who found that a 25 percent reduction in the welfare benefit would increase the percent of
women who are female heads by a mere .007. Clearly, therefore, a resolution of the differences in these
magnitudes is also a priority item for future research.37
VI. WHAT DO WE NEED TO KNOW?
This review of what we know about the effect of welfare on marriage and fertility has
demonstrated that much has been learned from research regarding the basic patterns of relationship
between welfare and the demographic outcomes, where a significant relationship appears and where it
does not, and about the general robustness of the strength of the estimated relationship across different
data sets and different methods. Based on this review, it is clear that a simple majority of the studies
conducted to date show a significant correlation between welfare benefits and marriage and fertility,
suggesting the presence of such behavioral incentive effects. However, in addition to this finding not
being able to explain the time-series increase in nonmarital fertility and decline in marriage, the majority
finding itself is weakened by the sensitivity of the result to the methodology used and to numerous other
differences in specifications across the studies. A neutral weighing of the evidence still leads to the
conclusion that welfare has incentive effects on marriage and fertility, but the uncertainty introduced by
the disparities in the research findings weakens the strength of that conclusion.
The resolution of the discrepancies between these studies is important for welfare policy because
the issue of how demographic outcomes are affected by the overall level of welfare benefits is so basic to
all discussions of welfare effects. It is also relevant to many of the reforms tested in the past several years
in the states and to many of the changes enacted in the 1996 welfare legislation. Women who lose
eligibility because of time limits or failure to comply with new rules, as well as women who do not
choose to go onto welfare when they would have otherwise, can be viewed as having suffered benefit
reductions similar to those whose effects are studied by the research literature. More generally, the
legislation is intended to reduce the welfare caseload and to lower the overall level of welfare benefits38
In addition, many of the states have adopted or will adopt family caps on payments to additional children,
21
changes in the AFDC-UP program to encourage married-couple welfare participation, and other rules that directly
affect fertility and marriage apart from simply reducing the caseload (see Maynard et al., forthcoming).
provided to low-income populations, and is explicitly intended to have effects on nonmarital fertility of
the type with which the research literature is concerned.
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Although much of the analysis of the 1996 legislation will be conducted with program evaluation
methodologies using experimental/control or treatment/comparison-group frameworks rather than the
econometric approach underlying the studies in the research literature, the latter has a role to play in
understanding the former. Ideally, the econometric research should be consistent with demonstration and
evaluation evidence, and any differences should be reconciled. If, for example, the New Jersey family
cap experiment shows little effect of a family cap on fertility, it would increase the confidence in that
finding considerably if it could be concluded from the research literature that incremental benefits in the
range tested in New Jersey also appear to have no effect on fertility. Even more important, and
continuing to follow the New Jersey case, the research literature should be capable of providing estimates
of the effects of benefit changes of greater magnitudes than that in New Jersey and for a greater number
of states with differing economic and social environments. Regardless of how many demonstration
evaluations are conducted, there will never be a sufficient number of them to provide the same range of
alternative programs that occur naturally over time and across states. Econometric research using
secondary data can tap into that larger range.
Unfortunately, the diversity in findings in the research literature necessarily reduces the power of
that research to play this role. Moreover, studies to resolve the discrepancies have not been conducted.
Three different types of studies are needed. First are replication studies that reanalyze the same data set
used by each study (or the major studies) to determine whether the results were correct as reported.
Second are robustness studies that conduct sensitivity testing to the model reported in each study to
determine if the results are robust to variations in the specification. Third are reconciliation studies that39
estimate common specifications across studies on common samples in an attempt to reconcile why the
studies achieved different findings. These types of studies—the “Three R’s” of replication, robustness,
and reconciliation—have not been applied to this literature. As in many other literatures whose main
contributors are academic scholars, the lack of attention to the Three R’s is primarily a result of the bias
in academic publishing and research toward new findings, new techniques, and original analysis, and
against mere replication of other researchers’ results. This situation is unlikely to change without
government or other funding to give researchers an incentive to conduct such studies.
The most likely cause of the discrepancy across studies is the omission of different alternative
influences on marriage and childbearing. Very few studies control for the same factors, and almost never
do the studies using the different methodologies outlined here attempt to control for the confounding
influences appropriate to the method in question (e.g., alternative influences across states, across states
over time, or in time series). Relatively little attention has been paid to nonwelfare influences,
particularly those that might be correlated with welfare, in the analyses. This defect could also be
addressed with additional research.4041
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Author, Date Type of Study Data Set Main Sample Dependent Variable Welfare Result
Acs Cross-state  NLSY 1979–1988 Women 14–23 Probability that woman has first Not significant
1994 comparison of levels  birth
Unmarried women 14–23 Probability that unmarried Not significant
woman has first birth
Women 14–23 Probability that woman has a Positive
birth and goes on AFDC
Women 14–23 who have had a Probability that woman has Not significant
first birth second birth
Acs Cross-state NLSY 1979–1988 Women 23–25 in 1988 who Probability that woman has Not significant for blacks or for
1996 comparison of levels have had a child second birth whites
Women 23–25 in 1988 who Probability that woman has Not significant. for blacks or for
have had a child and were on second birth whites
AFDC
Women 23–25 in 1988 who Probability that woman has Not significant. for blacks or for
have had a child and were on second birth whites
AFDC and who grew up in a
low income single parent home
Allen Cross-province Census of Canada Women less than 45 on or at Probability that woman is a Positive
1993 comparison of levels 1986 poverty line single parent
micro data
Probability that woman has an Positive
out of wedlock birth
Probability that woman is Positive
divorcedSUMMARY OF STUDIES OF EFFECT OF WELFARE ON THE FAMILY
(see notes at end of table)
Author, Date Type of Study Data Set Main Sample Dependent Variable Welfare Result
An, Haveman, Cross-state  PSID 1968–1987 Women 19–25 in 1987 Probability of having an out-of- Not significant
and Wolfe comparison of levels wedlock birth between ages 13
1993 and 18
Blank, George, Cross-state  Alan Guttmacher All U.S. states Abortion rate by state of
and London comparison of changes Institute data occurrence
1994 1974–1988











Abortion rates for state residents Not significant for both AFDC and
(occurring inside or outside the Medicaid restriction variables
state)
Difference between abortion
rates by state of occurrence and
by state of residence
AFDC: Not significant
Medicaid: In-state and border-
state restrictions significant, with 
larger gap associated with border-
state Medicaid restrictionsSUMMARY OF STUDIES OF EFFECT OF WELFARE ON THE FAMILY
(see notes at end of table)
Author, Date Type of Study Data Set Main Sample Dependent Variable Welfare Result
Blank, George, Cross-state  Centers for All U.S. states Abortion rates by age and race 
and London comparison of changes Disease Control
1994 data Four groups: teens and nonteens,
1973–1990 whites and nonwhites




Clarke and Cross-state  U.S. Vital Unmarried women 15–19 Illegitimacy rate Whites and blacks: no effect in





White: positive in OLS and 2SLS
Black: negative in OLS and
positive in 2SLS
Benefit differential: Not
significant for black or white
women in any specification
Cutright Time-series Vital Statistics Annual aggregates 1940–1965 U.S. illegitimacy rates Overall positive relationship holds
1970 1940–65 1940–1965 but not for specific time periods,
especially for blacks
Cross-state  4 U.S. states State illegitimacy ratio States with higher benefit levels or
comparison of levels 1950–1964 recipiency rates do not have higher
illegitimacy ratios
Time-series Several countries International illegitimacy rates Negative
Danziger, Cross-state  CPS  Women 25–54  Female headship Positive for white and nonwhite
Jakubson, comparison of levels 1975 married or female heads women
Schwartz, and
Smolensky 
1982SUMMARY OF STUDIES OF EFFECT OF WELFARE ON THE FAMILY
(see notes at end of table)
Author, Date Type of Study Data Set Main Sample Dependent Variable Welfare Result
Darity and Myers Time-series  Not reported Annual aggregates Ratio of black female-headed Not significant
1983 1955–1980 households to black non-female-
headed households 
Duncan and Cross-state PSID  Black women in 1985 who Probability of an out of wedlock Positive (weak) on AFDC related
Hoffman comparison of levels 1968–1985 turned 19 between 1973 and birth followed by AFDC receipt births
1990 1985
Not significant for non-AFDC
related births
Ellwood and Bane Within-state Survey of Income All women 16–44 Probability that woman is an Positive for whites and nonwhites
1985 comparison of women and Education independent female head 16–34, with higher significance
with different 1976 levels for whites and higher
probabilities of being magnitudes for nonwhites
on AFDC
Probability that woman is a Not significant for nonwhites
single mother
Positive for whites, but age range
is sensitive to specification
Single mothers 16–44 Probability that a single mother Positive for whites and nonwhites
lives independently 16–24
Married mothers 16–44 Probability that woman is newly Not significant for whites or
divorced nonwhites
Ever-married mothers 16–44 Probability that woman is Positive for whites and nonwhites
currently divorced 16–24 and for whites 25–30
Not significant for older nonwhite
womenSUMMARY OF STUDIES OF EFFECT OF WELFARE ON THE FAMILY
(see notes at end of table)
Author, Date Type of Study Data Set Main Sample Dependent Variable Welfare Result
Ellwood and Bane Within-state  Survey of Income Unmarried women without Probability that woman has a Not significant for whites and
1985 comparison of women and Education children or child < 1 nonmarital birth nonwhites 16–24
with different 1976
probabilities of being Positive for older white women
on AFDC 25–34
Never married women 16–44 Probability that a woman Not Significant for whites and
becomes a mother nonwhites 16–24
Positive for whites and nonwhites
25–34
Within-state  U.S. Vital Selected states, women 14–44 Percentage of ever-married Negative for whites and not
comparison of different Statistics and mothers who are divorced or significant for nonwhites
eligibility types Census separated
1970
Birthrate for unmarried women Not significant for whites and
nonwhites
Ratio of percentage of ever- Not significant for whites and
married mothers > 14 who are nonwhites
divorced or separated to
percentage of ever-married
childless women > 14 who are
divorced or separated
Ratio of birthrate of unmarried Not significant for whites and
women to birthrate of married nonwhites
women
Cross-state  U.S. Census All U.S. states Percentage of women > 14 who Not significant for whites or
comparison of changes 1960, 1970 are independent female heads blacksSUMMARY OF STUDIES OF EFFECT OF WELFARE ON THE FAMILY
(see notes at end of table)
Author, Date Type of Study Data Set Main Sample Dependent Variable Welfare Result
Ellwood and Bane Cross-state  U.S. Census All U.S. states Number of children living with a Positive for 1960 and 1970 benefit
1985 comparison of changes 1960, 1970 female head as a fraction of total levels of white and nonwhite
children not living with both women
parents
Percentage of ever-married Positive for whites in 1970
women > 14 who are divorced
Not significant for blacks in 1960
and 1970 or for whites in 1960
Unmarried birthrate Not significant for whites or
blacks
Fossett and Cross-city  Census 1980 270 SMSAs Percentage of black men in Negative
Kiecolt comparison of levels Vital Statistics metropolitan area who are
1993 1979–81 married
Percentage of black women in Negative
metropolitan area who are
married
Percentage of black women with Negative
children < 6 in metropolitan area
Percentage of black women with Negative
children < 18 in metropolitan
area
Percentage of families with Negative
children < 6 in metropolitan area
and who are marriedSUMMARY OF STUDIES OF EFFECT OF WELFARE ON THE FAMILY
(see notes at end of table)
Author, Date Type of Study Data Set Main Sample Dependent Variable Welfare Result
Fossett and Cross-city  Census 1980 270 SMSAs Percentage of families with Negative
Kiecolt comparison of levels Vital Statistics children > 18 in metropolitan
1993 1979–81 area and who are married
Percentage of children living in Negative
husband-and-wife families in
metropolitan area
Percentage of births to black Negative for all four groups, with
women in metropolitan area who a higher magnitude for black
are married women 20–29 than for black teens
Freshnock and Cross-county Vital Statistics Approx. 1000 counties with Illegitimate birthrate for Not significant for teens
Cutright  comparison of levels 1970 usable data unmarried women
1979 Positive for never-married whites
20–44
Negative for blacks 20–44, with a
larger magnitude in absolute value
than that of whites
Hill and O’Neill Cross-state comparison NLSY 1979–87 Women 23–30 in 1987 Probability a woman has had a Positive for white women
1993 of levels child but has never been married
since 1979 Not significant for black women
Probability a woman had an out- Positive for white women
of-wedlock birth in the last year
Not significant for black women
Hoffman and Cross-state comparison PSID 1969–1982 Women who were divorced or Probability of remarriage Not significant for blacks or
Duncan of levels separated 1969–82 and were  whites
1988 < 45 at time of eventSUMMARY OF STUDIES OF EFFECT OF WELFARE ON THE FAMILY
(see notes at end of table)
Author, Date Type of Study Data Set Main Sample Dependent Variable Welfare Result
Hoffman and Cross-state PSID 1967–85 Women with children and with a Probability of divorce Positive for AFDC 5-year moving
Duncan comparison of levels first marriage during 1967–1993 average
1995
Not significant for AFDC
guarantee
Hoynes Cross-state  PSID 1969–89 Women 16–50 either married or Probability a woman is a female Positive for blacks and whites,
1996 comparison of levels household head in selected states head with larger magnitude for blacks
Cross-state  Probability a woman is a female Zero and not significant for whites
comparison of changes head with state and/or individual fixed 
effects
Positive for blacks with state fixed
effects but zero and not significant
with individual fixed effects
Hutchens Cross-state  PSID 1968–1972 Female heads in 1970 in 20 Probability of 1970 female head Negative
1979 comparison of levels states remarrying or cohabiting by
1972
Hutchens, Cross-state  CPS 1984 Women < 36, with at least one Probability of being a household Positive for difference between
Jakubson, and comparison of levels child, no husband present head household head and subfamily
Schwartz head benefit levels
1989
Not significant for benefit
guarantee level aloneSUMMARY OF STUDIES OF EFFECT OF WELFARE ON THE FAMILY
(see notes at end of table)
Author, Date Type of Study Data Set Main Sample Dependent Variable Welfare Result
Hutchens, Cross-state  CPS 1984 Women < 36, with at least one Probability that a woman is on Difference between household
Jakubson, and comparison of levels child, no husband present or off welfare and is a household head and subfamily head benefits
Schwartz  head or subfamily head significantly positive only for
1989 household head vs. subfamily head
on welfare
All other effects insignificant
Jackson and Cross-state  National Center All women 15–44 Birthrate for a state in a year (by For both whites and blacks,
Klerman comparison of levels for Health age and race) negative for age < 21 and positive
1995 Statistics birth for age > 21
certificate tapes
1975–1990
Cross-state  Positive for whites through age 30,
comparison of changes with largest magnitudes in early
20s
Negative for blacks after age 33
Birthrate for a state in a year for Positive for whites 15–19 and for
first births (by age and race) blacks 16–26
Birthrate for a state in a year for Positive for whites > 17 and for
higher-order births (by age and blacks 18–21
race)
Selected states Marital birthrate (marital births Positive for blacks and whites
per total women)
Nonmarital birthrate (nonmarital Positive for blacks and whites
births per total women)SUMMARY OF STUDIES OF EFFECT OF WELFARE ON THE FAMILY
(see notes at end of table)
Author, Date Type of Study Data Set Main Sample Dependent Variable Welfare Result
Janowitz Cross-SMSA Census 1969, 58 SMSAs   Illegitimate birthrate among Positive for nonwhites 15–29
1976 comparison of levels 1970, 1973 > 250,000 with illegitimacy data unmarried women
DHEW 1968, by race Not significant for whites
1970
Lichter, LeClere, Cross-labor market area Census 1980 328 labor market areas Proportion of women Negative for all three measures for
and McLaughlin comparison of levels    1.  currently married blacks and whites
1991    2.  ever married
   3.  recently married (5 yr)
Lichter, Cross-labor market area NLSY 1979–1986 Never-married women 18–28 Probability a woman will have a Not significant
McLaughlin, comparison of levels from 1979 to 1986 transition into marriage
Kephart, and
Landry 1992
Lichter, Cross-county and -state Census 1980,1990 All counties with sufficient Fraction families with children  Positive for whites and blacks
McLaughlin, and comparison of changes sample size < 18 headed by never-married or
Ribar 1996 divorced women No effect for Latinos
Lundberg and Cross-state  NLSY 1979–1986 Unmarried white women 21–23 Probability that a teen will not Positive
Plotnick comparison of levels in 1986 marry conditional on having a
1990 birth
Probability that a teen carries Negative
pregnancy to term conditional
on pregnancy
Probability that a teen will Negative
become pregnant
Lundberg and Cross-state  NLSY 1979–1986 Unmarried women 21–23 in Probability a teen will not marry Positive for whites
Plotnick  comparison of levels 1986 conditional on having a birth
1995 Not significant for blacksSUMMARY OF STUDIES OF EFFECT OF WELFARE ON THE FAMILY
(see notes at end of table)
Author, Date Type of Study Data Set Main Sample Dependent Variable Welfare Result
Lundberg and Cross-state  NLSY 1979–1986 Unmarried women 21–23 in Probability that a teen carries Positive for whites
Plotnick  comparison of levels 1986 pregnancy to term conditional
1995 on having a pregnancy Not significant for blacks
Probability that a teen becomes Positive but small for whites
pregnant
Not significant for blacks
Matthews, Ribar, Cross-state  U.S. state data  All U.S. states Birthrate Negative






Moffitt Cross-state  CPS 1969, 1977, Men and women 16–55 Probability of being married Insignificant for whites
1990 comparison of levels 1985
Probability of being female head Negative for black men and mixed
for black women
Moffitt Cross-state  CPS 1968–1989 Women 20–44 with < 12 years Probability a woman is a Effects for whites are positive and
1994 comparison of levels of education subfamily or household head significant
Effects for blacks are insignificant
Cross-state  No effect for whites
comparison of changes
Negative effects for blacksSUMMARY OF STUDIES OF EFFECT OF WELFARE ON THE FAMILY
(see notes at end of table)
Author, Date Type of Study Data Set Main Sample Dependent Variable Welfare Result
Moore and Cross-state  Kanter and Zelnik Women 15–19 Probability a teen is sexually Positive for whites 16–18 with
Caldwell  comparison of levels 1971 survey active AFDC benefit level but not
1977 significant at other ages or for
blacks
Vital Statistics Selected states Probability a teen becomes Negative for blacks 12–15 but not
1974 pregnant sig. at other ages or for whites
Probability a pregnant teen will Negative
obtain an abortion
Probability a pregnant teen will Not significant
marry before the birth
Probability a pregnant teen will Not significant
have an out-of-wedlock birth
Out-of-wedlock birth rate of Moore, Morrison, and Glei 
women 15–44 1995
Moore, Morrison, Cross-state  National Survey Individuals 11–17 Probability of first premarital Not significant for girls and boys
and Glei  comparison of levels of Children 1976, sex
1995 1981, 1987
Probability of contraceptive use Not significant for girls or boys
conditional on premarital sex
Murray Time-series Vital Statistics Annual aggregates Illegitimacy ratio
1993 1960–1988
Cross-state  U.S. states Illegitimacy ratio Positive for white women starting
comparison of levels in the mid-60s
No relationship for black womenSUMMARY OF STUDIES OF EFFECT OF WELFARE ON THE FAMILY
(see notes at end of table)
Author, Date Type of Study Data Set Main Sample Dependent Variable Welfare Result
Ozawa Cross-state  Vital Statistics All U.S. states Illegitimacy ratio for women  Positive for white teens
1989 comparison of levels 1984 < 19
Not significant for black teens
Plotnick Cross-state  NLSY 1979–1984 Women 19–20 in 1984 Probability a teen has a Not significant for Hispanic or
1990 comparison of levels nonmarital birth by age 19 black women
Sometimes positive and
sometimes not significant for
white women
Rank Within-state Wisconsin Two percent sample of all cases Fertility rate Negative effect
1989 comparison of welfare records on rolls in September 1980
participants and 1980–1983
nonparticipants
Robins and Cross-state or -region CPS 1980–1988 Never-married women 18–30 Probability of giving birth to Not significant for whites and
Fronstin comparison of changes with no or 1 child first child positive for blacks
1996
Never-married women 18–30 Probability of giving birth to Not significant
with no or 1 child and with no first child
high school diploma
Cross-state  CPS 1980–1988 Never-married women 18–30 Probability a woman will give Negative for whites and positive
comparison of changes with at least one child birth to another child for blacks for second birth only
in benefit increments
Higher-order births not significant
for both races
Never-married women 18–30 Probability a woman will give Positive for second birth
with at least one child and with birth to another child
no high school diploma Not significant for higher-order
birthsSUMMARY OF STUDIES OF EFFECT OF WELFARE ON THE FAMILY
(see notes at end of table)
Author, Date Type of Study Data Set Main Sample Dependent Variable Welfare Result
Rosenzweig Cross-state  NLSY Women aged 22 from 1980 to Probability a woman has had a Premarital birth vs. no birth:
1995 comparison of changes 1979–1990 1987 premarital birth vs. only marital positive with a higher magnitude
births or no births for low income women
Low income subsample: whites
stronger than blacks
Marital births vs. no births: not
significant for blacks or whites in
full or low income samples
Rosenzweig and Cross-state  NLSY 1979–1987 Female siblings 22–29 in 1987 Probability of coresiding with AFDC benefit has no effect, but
Wolpin comparison of levels parents and not being on welfare Food Stamp benefit has negative
1994 vs. not coresiding with parents effect
and not being on welfare
Schultz Cross-state  U. S. Census Women 15–65 Probability a woman is married Negative at ages 15–24 for blacks
1994 comparison of levels 1980 and whites, not at other ages
Number of children ever born Positive for black women 25–34
Negative for white women 15–24
Not significant at other ages
Schultz Cross-state  U. S. Census Women 15–64 Probability a woman is married Negative for blacks and whites
1995 comparison of levels 1990
Number of children ever born Negative for blacks and whites
Southwick Cross-state  AFDC 31 U.S. states Percentage of AFDC families Positive
1978 comparison of levels  Characteristics with absent fathers
Study 1973SUMMARY OF STUDIES OF EFFECT OF WELFARE ON THE FAMILY
(see notes at end of table)
Author, Date Type of Study Data Set Main Sample Dependent Variable Welfare Result
Southwick  Cross-state  AFDC 31 U.S. states Proportion of AFDC families in Positive for difference and ratio
1978 comparison of levels  Characteristics which the father is not married between income available to a
Study 1973 to the mother two- parent family vs. single-
parent family
Proportion of AFDC families Negative
with at least 1 illegitimate child
Percentage of AFDC families Positive for divorce and legal
with divorce, legal separation, or separation
separation without a court
decree Not significant for separation
without a court decree
Winegarden Time-series Aggregate U.S. Annual aggregates Illegitimacy ratio Positive for blacks but not for
1988 data 1947–1983 whites
Winkler Cross-state  National Survey Mothers 19–35 Probability that a mother lives in Not significant
1995 comparison of levels of Families and an AFDC-UP defined two-
Households 1987 parent family
Probability that a mother is Negative for some specifications
married
Yelowitz Cross-state  CPS 1989–1992 Women 18–55 with at least one Probability that a mother is Having children in a family that is
1993 comparison of changes child married eligible for Medicaid has a
positive effect
Notes:
1) All Welfare Results are reported by race if separate estimates by race were obtained. If no race is mentioned, the results apply to all women.
2) Data Set refers only to the data source for the dependent variable.6061
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